Much of the existing research on election violence focuses on what causes it and what it entails. Physical attacks, threats, and harassment are forms of violence widely described in examples of election violence. Feminist scholars suggest that there is an undercounting of psychological forms of election violence (the form of violence experienced more commonly by women), as threats and harassment are not always reported or expressed publicly.[1] Threats and acts of violence can have a profound impact on the targeted individuals, communities, and institutions, reconfiguring how they interact and navigate a world that appears fundamentally different to the one they knew before.
In the U.S., public discourse on election violence relays fears that it could “normalize political violence and stymie civic engagement and democratic processes.”[2] The thinking is that election violence might deter voters from participating in elections, lead to doubts about the credibility of election results, or negatively affect the global reputation of the U.S. while emboldening autocrats world-wide.[3] However, most research on election violence focuses on what causes it and less so on its consequences. As some scholars note, “[t]he scarcity of knowledge is surprising because election violence…has potentially important implications for democratic survival, breakdowns, and regime transitions.” [4]
While an uptick in political and election violence in the U.S. has caught the attention of research communities,[5] there is limited working knowledge on the effects of election violence in the context of established democracies. It is credible to suggest that election violence has detrimental effects on the status of democracy in consolidated democracies for the reasons stated above—or, equally credible, that consolidated democracies, through their strong institutional legacies, rule of law, and democratic norms, can be effectively insulated and can thereby extinguish the long-term risk of election violence. In short, the existing research demonstrates how weak institutions might facilitate election violence and not how election violence might facilitate weak institutions. A better understanding of the relationship between election violence and democratic backsliding would enable targeted policy responses and other public interventions.
There is limited research, largely from the context of emerging or unconsolidated democracies, that considers the broader consequences of election violence. These results reveal the corrosive potential of election violence in the U.S., including effects—especially gendered effects—on elected officials themselves and the make-up of governing institutions, effects on voting behavior and public attitudes, and the possibility of widespread mental and physical health effects among the public.
Effects of Election Violence on Elected Officials
There is a wealth of research on how political violence influences the behavior of elected officials, especially when they are the intended target of violence. While this literature studies events that are not always temporally tied to an election period—one of the core elements in the study of election violence in particular— the literature nonetheless offers important insight into how election violence could change the behavior of elected officials.
In the United States, the scale of political violence against elected officials is rapidly increasing beyond the more attention-grabbing, large-scale events like January 6th. For instance, local elected officials are reporting higher rates of targeted violence. The Brennan Center for Justice surveyed state legislators and local officeholders (a total of 1,700 officials from 50 states) in October 2023 about their experiences with political violence. [6] They found that 40% of state legislators and 18% of local officeholders reported experiencing threats or attacks in the past three years. 38% of state legislators further reported an increase in the amount of abuse they’ve experienced since first taking public office.
The threat or use of violence against elected officials can have a chilling effect on their desire to advocate for the issues they care about, to engage fully with constituents, or even to continue serving in public office.[7] In 2021, research from the Mayors Innovation Project reported that 32.2% of mayors considered leaving office in response to political violence and 69.8% of mayors reported knowing someone who chose not to run for office due to concerns about political violence.[8]
Although these effects are felt by elected officials across the board, some elected officials—particularly women, racial minorities, and/or members of the LGBTQ+ community—experience disproportionately more threats. Quarterly surveying and reporting from the Bridging Divides Institute and CivicPulse finds that “women and minority officials continue to experience greater hostility compared to their counterparts.”[9]
Several studies discuss gendered effects of election violence, particularly against women but also against “non-hegemonic” men and members of the LGBTQ+ community. One study provided a helpful framework that disentangles gendered political violence through distinguishing between gendered motives, gendered forms, and gendered impacts.[10]
- Gendered motives (also reviewed in the section What drives election violence?) involve perpetrators’ reasons for using violence, highlighting a distinction between “perpetrators [that] commit violence to preserve the gendered order of political power” and perpetrators who commit acts of political violence for a different purpose, even if the victim happens to be a woman.
- Gendered forms “show that gender structures how men and women perpetrate and experience political violence [and how] beliefs and attitudes about gender…shape the form of the attack.” For example, women are more likely subjected to psychological violence, sexualized attacks, and (in some cases) sexual violence[11] whereas men are more likely than women to be subject to physical attacks.[12]
- Gendered impacts “capture how audiences understand the gender dimension of political violence, even if these understandings differ from motivations and forms.” Understanding gendered impacts clarifies how an act of political violence or election violence may inadvertently suppress women’s political representation—even if diminishing women’s political power is not the motive—as fear of violence might particularly discourage female candidates from running for office or reinforce traditional ideals of politics as a masculine domain, leading to less public support for female candidates.
In relation to the last of these—gendered impacts—one study finds that election violence leads to lower levels of women’s political representation/political participation. Analyzing data from 128 countries, it finds that “more frequent pre-election violence is associated with a reduction in the proportion of women-held seats in the subsequent national legislature.”[13] Remarkably, this study’s statistical analysis revealed in absolute terms a “37% decline in the overall proportion of women-held national legislative seats.” It theorizes that pre-election violence negatively influences the political recruitment process for women, including candidates’ decisions to run for office or political parties’ decision to support candidates. Notably, it also finds that “non-violent contentious events” like protests, detentions, or harassment[14] did not have an adverse effect on women’s representation.
By looking at how local elected officials respond to political violence, we can ascertain the effects that election violence may have on their behavior in office and willingness to seek re-election. Initial research on the gendered impacts election violence supports this idea, as a negative effect on women’s participation in politics is globally observed. Fewer women in office means a less representative government and, therefore, a weaker democracy.
Effects of Election Violence on Voters: Voting Behavior and Public Attitudes
Research on the public’s response to election violence, including the effects of election violence on voting behavior, shows mixed effects. For instance, pre-election violence could have the effect of instilling fear in the electorate, leading to low voter turn-out; or it could have the opposite effect of emboldening voters to go to the polls as a rejection of a candidate who had engaged in violence. Take these two studies looking at cross-national data from sub-Saharan Africa. One finds that election violence causes citizens to fear elections, creates less support for democracy and more support for autocracy, and leads to low voter turnout among citizens who fear elections.[15] Yet, another study finds a backlash effect for election violence wherein “fear of election violence appears to mobilize support [for] opposition candidates” in presidential elections (as election violence is considered to be strategically used by incumbents to remain in power).[16] The differences could be due to the specific research questions used, available data, and methodological choices—nonetheless, the divergent results point to a lack of consensus on the effects of election violence on voting behavior and public attitudes.
Two prominent cases of election violence are frequently examined in the research reviewed: Nigeria and Kenya. Both countries have a history of election violence in multiple electoral contests. The examination of these countries’ experiences with election violence demonstrates how election violence can have disparate effects on different communities within a country, and be measured in various ways, leading to a lack of clarity on the effect of election violence on voting behavior and public attitudes.
- Examining how the media frames election violence and the subsequent influence of this framing on the public in Nigeria, one study suggests that election violence produces feelings of “dissatisfaction, dread, and dejection…preventing [the public] from wanting to vote in [elections].” Surveys in this research suggest that election violence deters voting unless the government can ensure safety at the polls.[17]
- Looking at how youth engage with violent elections, another study identifies “constrained optimists” in Nigeria—young, urban, educated voters—who believe that “their political institutions [are] broken [but] are determined to elect better candidates and mobilize their fellow citizens for political reform.” These voters are willing to elect candidates “who use violence defensively, apologize for past violence, or whose supporters carried out violence on their behalf without their knowledge,” acknowledging the challenge of “a peaceful and clean campaign.”[18]
- Examining results from a vignette experiment in Kenya, one study finds that voters are generally less likely to vote for a candidate rumored to have engaged in election violence. However, this is not consistent across all voters—victims of election violence and the poor “are less likely to sanction candidates rumored to have used violence, especially when these candidates have a good record of reducing poverty.” Further, the study finds that voters were less likely to vote if all candidates where rumored to have used violence, suggesting “that perceived violations of democratic norms dampen willingness to vote.”[19]
- Another study looking at the effects of election violence in Kenya finds that voter backlash to election violence is “more significant than research has considered,” with data suggesting that “the use of violence reduces voter support for the candidates who use it, including among coethnics.”[20]
In total, the effect of election violence on voting behavior and public attitudes is not very straightforward. Voters may respond to election violence in a wide variety of ways depending on the context: Who is the perpetrator? Who are the victims? When and where did it take place? Who is the community or voting population whose behavior we are observing? For various reasons, therefore, it is currently difficult to say what the aggregate effect of election violence is on voting behavior and public attitudes.
Broader Public Health Effects of Election Violence
It should come as little surprise that violence results in immediate risks to personal and community health (comprehensively understood as physical, mental, and emotional health). Data on violent events always track reported fatalities, injuries, and damage to surrounding infrastructure. The scale of emergency medical response necessary to save lives and prevent further injury is only one component to understanding the broader public health effects of violence. One study unpacks the effect of interpersonal violence on healthcare in the U.S., estimating a financial cost of $8.7 billion in 2017.[21] There is long-term damage, too, as victims of violence require physical rehabilitation and mental/emotional support.
There is limited research examining the public health effects of election violence in particular, suggesting a new avenue of research for understanding the broader effects of election violence. It is safe to assume that direct victims of election violence will suffer physical, mental, and emotional health effects. But what about others who are not direct victims but rather are witnesses to election violence? One study suggests that there is a large public health effect related to election violence, namely a spike in symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It estimates that 12.5% of American adults experienced PTSD symptoms due to the stress of the 2020 Presidential elections, significantly higher than the average 3.5% annual prevalence rate of PTSD symptoms observed in medical research.[22] Additionally, this study asserts a relationship between PTSD symptoms and affective polarization, finding that “negativity towards opposing partisans [is] correlated with PTSD symptoms.”[23]
Comprehensively understanding the health effects of violence—not only that of direct victims but also the mental and emotional health effects of observing widescale violence—can provide insight on the wider effects of election violence. This is especially true considering that the widespread mental and emotional effects of stress or post-traumatic stress are significant from a public health perspective.
Continued Reading
Sousa C, A. (2013) Political violence, collective functioning and health: a review of the literature. Med Confl Surviv; 29(3):169-97. doi: 10.1080/13623699.2013.813109. PMID: 24133929; PMCID: PMC3801099. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3801099/
Bergengruen, V. (2022, November 4) The United States of Political Violence. Time. Retrieved on October 31, 2024, from, https://time.com/6227754/political-violence-us-states-midterms-2022/
Ramachandran, G. et al. (2024) Intimidation of State and Local Officeholders. Brennan Center for Justice. Retrieved on October 31, 2024, from, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/intimidation-state-and-local-officeholders
Web Foundation, (2020, November 25) The impact of online gender-based violence on women in public life. Retrieved on October 31, 2024, form, https://webfoundation.org/2020/11/the-impact-of-online-gender-based-violence-on-women-in-public-life/
Footnotes:
[1] Bjarnegård, E. (2023). The continuum of election violence: Gendered candidate experiences in the Maldives. International Political Science Review, 44(1), 107-121. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120977111
[2] Simi, P. & Hughes, S. (2023, October 5) The slow burn threatening our democracy. Lawfare. Retrieved on August 28, 2024, from, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy
[3] Ware, J. (2024 April) Preventing U.S. election violence in 2024. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved August 28, 2024, from, https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-us-election-violence-2024#chapter-title-0-4
[4] von Borzyskowski, I., & Kuhn, P. M. (2020). Dangerously informed: Voter information and pre-electoral violence in Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 57(1), 15-29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319885166
[5] WZB. (2022, October 6-7) Political violence and democratic backsliding. Conference by the Research Unit “Transformations of Democracy.” Retrieved August 28, 2024, from, https://www.wzb.eu/en/events/political-violence-and-democratic-backsliding
[7] Bridging Divides Initiative. (2024, February 8). Local officials continue to face high, widespread hostility: Latest findings from ongoing threats and harassment survey. Bridging Divides Initiative. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/updates/2024/local-officials-continue-face-high-widespread-hostility-latest-findings-ongoing
[10] Bardall, G., Bjarnegård, E., & Piscopo, J. M. (2020). How is Political Violence Gendered? Disentangling Motives, Forms, and Impacts. Political Studies, 68(4), 916-935. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719881812
[11] Krause, J. (2020). Restrained or constrained? Elections, communal conflicts, and variation in sexual violence. Journal of Peace Research, 57(1), 185-198. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319891763
[12] Bjarnegård, E. (2023). The continuum of election violence: Gendered candidate experiences in the Maldives. International Political Science Review, 44(1), 107-121. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120977111
[13] Wood, R. M. (2024). The effects of electoral violence on women’s legislative representation. Political Research Quarterly, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241252373
[14] It should be noted that most research considers harassment as a form of violence (i.e., psychological violence).
[15] von Borzyskowski, I., & Kuhn, P. M. (2020). Dangerously informed: Voter information and pre-electoral violence in Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 57(1), 15-29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319885166
[16] Burchard, S. M. (2020). Get out the vote – or else: the impact of fear of election violence on voters. Democratization, 27(4), 588–604. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1710490
[17] Aluya, I., & Terver, J. (2024). Framing and the Social Construction of Violence in Select Online News Discourse on the 2023 General Elections in Nigeria. Studies in Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis, 5(2), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.48185/spda.v5i2.1182
[18] Davis, J. & Turnbull, M. (2024). Nigerian youth engagement in violent electoral environments: Political apathy or ‘constrained optimism’? African Affairs, 123(491). 133-164. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adae010
[19] Gutiérrez-Romero, R., & LeBas, A. (2020). Does electoral violence affect vote choice and willingness to vote? Conjoint analysis of a vignette experiment. Journal of Peace Research, 57(1), 77-92. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319892677
[20] Rosenzweig, S.C. (2021). Dangerous disconnect: Voter backlash, elite misperception, and the costs of violence as an electoral tactic. Political Behavior 43, 1731–1754. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09707-9
[21] Grossman, D. C., & Choucair, B. (2019). Violence and the US health care sector: Burden and response. Health Affairs, 38(10):1638-1645. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00642. PMID: 31589530.
[22] Fraser T, Panagopoulos C, Smith K. (2023). Election-related post-traumatic stress: Evidence from the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Politics and the Life Sciences. 42(2):179-204. doi:10.1017/pls.2023.8
[23] Ibid
Photo credit: Kris Washington via Flickr
