Limiting State Violence and Activist Violence in Nonviolent Resistance Struggles

More than eight years since the Arab Spring reached Syria, the Assad government is on the verge of militarily re-taking the last rebel stronghold in Idlib province. After abouteight years of civil war, over half a million people are dead, 11 million are displaced, and the Assad regime is firmly entrenched—a far cry from activists’ demands in early 2011. If there were ever a case to demonstrate that violence doesn’t “work,” from the perspective of either side, this is it. The government’s violence against nonviolent activists initiated a cycle that escalated into civil war, and though this violent strategy may have nearly brought the government military victory, this victory is over a country in ruins with an aggrieved population afraid to speak freely, eight out of ten of whom live in poverty. The turn to violence on the part of the resistance—a decision made by some several months into the uprising that violence was needed to protect the nonviolent movement from the state’s violent repression—grew into a many-pronged armed insurgency and ultimately contributed to the escalation to civil war, which massively increased civilian casualties and in the end has not achieved the objectives of the resistance. From even a purely pragmatic perspective, it is worth noting that nonviolence is often abandoned after a few months of “not working,” whereas violence is given years and years to “work”—and often with disastrous consequences, both for human lives and for the desired objectives.

This research is extremely valuable in that it provides activists with tools to prevent a similar escalatory spiral from transpiring in other contexts, thereby giving a nonviolent movement its best chances of success. While the author’s recommendations for limiting and countering state violence are useful for thinking through specific movement tacticsvis-à-vis security forces, her recommendations for limiting activist violence are perhaps even more fundamental to a movement’s organizing. Prior to decisions about specific tactics that will make it more difficult for the state to use violence, a movement needs to put significant thought into how it is going to establish and promulgate its identity,principles, and organizational structure in a way that best supports the maintenance of nonviolent discipline.

As the author notes, nonviolent discipline is itself a strong factor in limiting state violence, as a government—and particularly the security forces carrying out its orders— find(s) it much easier to use violent repression if it can credibly claim to do so in self-defense to protect the country and its citizens from “armed rebels” or “terrorists.” (Though it is important to add that governments still do often carry out violent repression even against completely nonviolent movements.) Therefore, movement leaders should consider cultivating an ethos where nonviolence is an essential—and publicized—part of the movement’s identity and an embodied practice that becomes second nature for activists, even under the most repressive conditions. Doing so may be a considerable challenge, however, given how closely both “resistance” and “protection” are tied to violence in common-sense thinking. Movement leaders must therefore honor activists’ need to respond vigorously to acts of state violence as a matter of self-respect and out of concern for security, while also ensuring that such impulses are channeled into tangible and effective nonviolent alternatives. While it is crucial that they inform activists about recent research demonstrating the overwhelmingly better prospects of nonviolent resistance for both movement success and protection, movement leaders also should not depend solely on rational arguments to convince activists of the requirement for nonviolence. They should also understand—and identify actions that fulfill—the emotional needs of their fellow activists, who may not be influenced by appeals to reason alone. For instance, actions like throwing paint balloons (instead of, say, stones) at security forces in Bahrain, the author notes, provide immediate satisfaction to activists who can see for themselves—and make known to others—the impact of their resistance, through their village’s color marked on a police vehicle. This is of course just one example, but the larger point is that more thought needs to be devoted to developing tactics that will meet activists’ need for real agency against impossibly cruel circumstances, while also challenging false assumptions about the greater effectiveness of violence. Doing so can ultimately mean the prevention of civil war and a better chance at achieving the goals of the nonviolent movement.