This analysis summarizes and reflects on the following research: Freedman, M., & Klor, E. F. (2023). When deterrence backfires: House demolitions, Palestinian radicalization, and Israeli fatalities. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 67(7-8), 1592-1617.
Talking Points:
In the context of the second Palestinian intifada (roughly 2000-2006) and Israeli counterterrorism policy:
- While Israel’s use of selective counterterrorism, in the form of punitive house demolitions, did not have a clear impact on Palestinian public opinion, Israel’s use of indiscriminate counterterrorism, in the form of precautionary house demolitions, resulted in more “radicalized” political attitudes among Palestinians from the same district.
- Palestinians’ political “radicalization” due to an increase in precautionary house demolitions in a particular district was associated with an increase in fatal violence against Israelis committed by individuals from that same district (during the 90-180 days after the public opinion survey measuring “radicalization”).
- Although counterterrorism strategy is intended to influence armed groups, its effects go beyond these groups to influence civilian actors, as well.
Key Insight for Informing Practice:
- To reveal the porous line between civilian and combatant categories is not to argue that Israel treat all civilians like combatants and ignore the ethical and legal imperative of non-combatant immunity. Rather, it is to argue precisely the opposite: that treating Palestinian civilians as if they were combatants by committing indiscriminate harm against them will, in fact, push more civilians in the direction of armed groups, contributing to a swell in their ranks—ultimately to the detriment of Israeli security. In other words, whether we are concerned about the safety and security of Palestinians or that of Israelis, we should oppose Israel’s current military assault on Gaza.
Summary:
When powerful countries are threatened by indiscriminate violence on the part of non-state actors—a form of violence typically called “terrorism”—they largely resort to repressive counterterrorism strategies, hoping these will make them safer. As with the logic of violence more generally, the thinking here is that if “we” hurt “them,” “they” will be deterred from hurting “us” further. Seldom taken seriously by political leaders, however, is the possibility that by hurting “them,” “we” may actually create greater outrage and grievance, reinvigorating “their” motivation to harm “us.” Counterterrorism—like other forms of violence—can have the opposite effect from that intended.
Michael Freedman and Esteban F. Klor examine these divergent effects of counterterrorism in the context of the second Palestinian Intifada against Israel (roughly 2000-2006), which entailed an escalation of violence by both Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Palestinian resistance groups. They note that existing scholarship makes a distinction between selective and indiscriminate counterterrorism, suggesting that selective counterterrorism is more effective than indiscriminate counterterrorism, as the latter is more likely to backfire due to its greater ability to “radicalize” the population against whom it is used (though empirical findings have been mixed).
| Punitive house demolitions: | When the Israeli government destroys the houses of Palestinians identified as directly responsible for violence against Israel; intended as a deterrent against future attacks. Seen as an example of selective counterterrorism. |
| Precautionary house demolitions: | When the Israeli government destroys the houses of Palestinians, not because they are deemed responsible for violence against Israel but because the Israeli government wants to clear space for a security buffer or some other military purpose. Seen as an example of indiscriminate counterterrorism. When the Israeli government destroys the houses of Palestinians, not because they are deemed responsible for violence against Israel but because the Israeli government wants to clear space for a security buffer or some other military purpose. Seen as an example of indiscriminate counterterrorism. |
The authors investigate these causal relationships in two parts, focusing on punitive and precautionary house demolitions—representing selective and indiscriminate counterterrorism, respectively. First, they examine what, if any, effect punitive or precautionary house demolitions have on the “radicalization” of Palestinian political attitudes. Second, they examine what, if any, effect “radicalized” political attitudes have on the subsequent level of violence against Israelis.
The authors draw on three data sets for their quantitative analysis. Available house demolition data compiled by B’Tselem (an Israeli human rights organization) includes all punitive house demolitions September 2000-December 2005 and all precautionary house demolitions 2004-2005, with data on location and other details. Palestinian public opinion data comes from 25 polls conducted November 2000-December 2006 and includes residence location, which allows the authors to specify the areas where house demolitions occurred. “Political radicalization” was measured by individuals’ responses to questions about which Palestinian political group they support (Fatah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or no faction) and whether they support negotiations with Israel, with a lack of support for either Fatah and/or negotiations indicating “radicalization.” Data on Israeli and Palestinian fatalities was compiled by B’Tselem and the Israeli Security Agency.
Their first statistical model assesses whether there is a correlation over time between the number of houses demolished in a particular district within four weeks of a given poll and the subsequent political attitudes of individuals within that same district (as reflected in that poll), while controlling for other factors that could also influence political attitudes. This basic model is run in various ways to assess effects of punitive versus precautionary house demolitions.
When looking at punitive house demolitions in particular, the authors find no correlation between these and changes in Palestinians’ political attitudes, whether related to support for political groups or negotiations. When the authors examine precautionary house demolitions, however, they find a corresponding decrease in Palestinian support both for Fatah and for negotiations with Israel—in other words, more “radicalized” political attitudes, with respect to both indicators. Furthermore, they find that these effects (and the magnitude of these effects) on political opinion last over time, at both eight-week and twelve-week intervals between precautionary house demolitions and opinion polls. The authors contend, therefore, that Palestinians become politically “radicalized” in response to indiscriminate counterterrorism policies (with enduring effects) but not in response to selective forms of counterterrorism.
The second major part of their analysis concerns whether more “radical” public opinion (stemming from precautionary house demolitions) results in more attacks against Israelis—which would indicate that indiscriminate forms of counterterrorism could be counterproductive in terms of Israeli security. They find that “decreases in support for Fatah and peace negotiations at the district level (brought by an increase of precautionary house demolitions) are associated with an increase in terror fatalities originating in that district after 90 days” and “up to 180 days after the survey.” As such, the influence of “radicalized” public opinion on the number of attacks on Israelis becomes apparent in the “medium to long-term.”
While the authors establish a link between indiscriminate counterterrorism against Palestinians, subsequent radicalization of Palestinian public opinion, and further attacks against Israelis, they note that they still do not know the exact mechanisms by which each variable leads to the next, especially whether the link between so-called “radicalization” and further violence against Israelis is due to “increased support for militant groups” or “increased mobilization and recruitment to militant groups.” Either way, it is clear that, although counterterrorism strategy is intended to influence armed groups, its effects go beyond these groups to influence civilian actors, as well.
Informing Practice:
The human desire for security is understandable. The difficulty emerges when humans engage in security-seeking behaviors that actively harm others, violating their need for security. While it is critical to consider the ethical dimensions of such behavior—of using violence and other forms of repression against other human beings with the intent of making your own group safer—the question of efficacy is just as critical: Does harming the group that is threatening you actually make you safer?
This research provides evidence that indiscriminate harm—carried out as part of counterterrorism policy against members of an opponent group—can backfire, making those in whose name it was carried out less safe. This result points to just how porous the boundary is between civilians and combatants—in particular, how indiscriminate counterterrorism practices can move previously “moderate” civilians to support or maybe even participate in armed groups.
The Israeli government and its allies, including the U.S., should take these findings seriously. It is worth noting that these research findings were identified in relation to a specific dimension of Israeli counterterrorism policy: precautionary house demolitions. As devastating as those house demolitions no doubt were to the families they affected, how much more might we expect people to become “radicalized,” and then to support or participate in counter-violence against Israel, after being subjected to widespread, indiscriminate bombing and other forms of direct, physical violence?
We are currently seeing the effects of indiscriminate violence against people in Gaza to the extreme—over 37,000 individuals killed in the past eight months (as of writing), including over 15,000 children. Whole neighborhoods—schools, apartment buildings, mosques—flattened. No hospitals fully operational. Families facing “catastrophic hunger and famine-like conditions,” with children at risk of dying from malnutrition, while international aid trucks sit waiting at the border, denied entry by “systematic obstruction at Israeli-controlled crossing points.” Ask yourself: If these were the conditions you were currently living in with your family, how would you feel about the people or the country dropping the bombs and preventing aid from entering? If you were a kid growing up under these conditions, learning about the world every day through the hell you were being forced to endure, listening to your elders as they identified Israel as responsible and hearing your older cousins talk about armed struggle as the only viable form of resistance under such conditions, where do you think you might find yourself in 5-10 years and doing what? How likely is it that you would see peaceful relations with Israel as a viable way forward that will ensure your safety and freedom and dignity?
To reveal the porous line between civilian and combatant categories, as illustrated in a child’s eventual move into a militant group, is most certainly not to argue that Israel treat all civilians like combatants and ignore the ethical and legal imperative of non-combatant immunity (as it seems already to be doing, with everyday Gazan civilians and aid workers alike). Rather, it is to argue precisely the opposite: that treating civilians as if they were combatants by committing indiscriminate harm against them will, in fact, push more civilians in the direction of armed groups, contributing to a swell in their ranks—ultimately to the detriment of Israeli security.
To point out that the current military assault on Gaza—even if it decimates Hamas—will simply create conditions for further violence against Israel is not to justify this return violence; it is to state a fact. It is to underscore the urgency of profoundly rethinking what types of actions make us (humans, whatever political community we are a part of) more secure.
Again, the desire to seek security, to do something that we think will make us safer, especially in response to harms or threats, is understandable. But if those security-seeking actions ultimately (and predictably) will make us less secure, that is a compelling reason—beyond the many other compelling ethical reasons—not to engage in them. In other words, whether we are concerned about the safety and security of Palestinians or that of Israelis, we should oppose Israel’s current military assault on Gaza.
Security for Israelis and Palestinians will come—if it comes—when large numbers of both Palestinians and Israelis recognize how their well-being is deeply linked and mutually dependent. It will come when the voices in both Palestine and Israel calling for nonviolent resistance against the Israeli occupation, and ultimately some form of coexistence under just socio-political conditions, overwhelm the calls on either side for genocidal decimation of the “other”—and when powerful actors on the world stage become strategic in their support for those voices. [MW]
Continued Reading:
El Deeb, S. (2024, June 16). The war in Gaza has wiped out entire Palestinian families. AP documents 60 who lost dozens or more. AP News. Retrieved June 25, 2024, from https://apnews.com/article/gaza-palestinians-families-israel-war-deaths-a9f8bcfe402c17f1f78903eae67b7a7d
UNICEF. (2024, June 11). Almost 3,000 malnourished children at risk of “dying before their families’ eyes” as Rafah offensive disconnects them from treatment – UNICEF. Retrieved June 25, 2024, from https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/almost-3000-malnourished-children-risk-dying-their-families-eyes-rafah-offensive
Human Rights Watch. (2024, May 14). Gaza: Israelis attacking known aid worker locations. Retrieved June 25, 2024, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/14/gaza-israelis-attacking-known-aid-worker-locations
Casey, N. (2024). ‘Where is the Palestinian Gandhi?’ The New York Times Magazine, May 5. Retrieved June 19, 2024, from https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/01/magazine/issa-amro-palestinian-nonviolent-activist.html?searchResultPosition=2
Organizations:
Parents Circle-Families Forum: https://www.theparentscircle.org/en/
Combatants for Peace: https://cfpeace.org/
Women in Black: https://womeninblack.org/
B’Tselem: https://www.btselem.org/
Key Words: counterterrorism, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, house demolitions, radicalization, armed groups, public opinion, security
Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons
