This analysis summarizes and reflects on the following research: Citation: Piazza, J. A. (2023). Political polarization and political violence. Security Studies, 32(3), 476-504. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225780
Talking Points
- Political polarization makes support for and the occurrence of political violence more likely.
- In the U.S., Republicans and Democrats who exhibit higher levels of polarization—who “believe members of the opposing political party to be a threat to the nation’s well-being and [to] love America less”—are more likely to support using violence for political purposes.
- Across 83 democracies worldwide, a higher overall level of political polarization makes it more likely a country will experience a higher level of political violence.
- Polarization may contribute to political violence in three ways: through the dehumanization and demonization of political opponents, the cultivation of a sense of moral superiority and certainty among partisans, and the facilitation of group mobilization.
- To weaken support for political violence, political elites need to step up and publicly condemn political violence, tone down “inflammatory [and demonizing] public rhetoric,” encourage tolerance of political opponents, and monitor disinformation.
Key Insight for Informing Practice
- Strong cross-cutting relationships are the antidote to polarization and political violence. The more we build and nurture relationships with people who come from different ideological perspectives—but with whom we may share other identities or commitments or hobbies—the more resilient our communities will be when faced with rising tensions or violent incidents that could otherwise precipitate further violence.
Summary
In the U.S. and around the world, both political polarization and political violence have been on the rise in recent years. In light of these trends, James A. Piazza asks: Is political polarization in democracies related to an increase in political violence? Although past research has examined the relationship between political polarization and various other attitudes and behaviors, surprisingly little research has been conducted on this relationship between political polarization and support for—or the actual occurrence of—political violence.
The author suggests that polarization may contribute to political violence in three ways: through the dehumanization and demonization of political opponents, the cultivation of a sense of moral superiority and certainty among partisans, and the facilitation of group mobilization. First, polarization may make it easier to demonize or dehumanize those of the opposing political party, thereby making the turn to violence against them more acceptable. Previous research has pointed to a process of moral disengagement, whereby the usual moral consideration given to other people is no longer thought to apply, due to representations and perceptions of them as sub-human or evil.
Second, polarization “lends a moralized and zero-sum ethos to politics,” characterized by disgust and hostility towards—and desire for distance from—the other group. When one believes in the moral superiority of one’s own group and the moral depravity of another group, it is easier to see oneself as engaged in a fight of good versus evil, making violence against them easier to justify—and perhaps even morally required.
Third, polarization can be instrumentally useful for mobilizing groups of people, a prerequisite for organized political violence. Political elites often make use of and exacerbate social and political divisions to energize and unify in-groups against out-groups. This form of mobilization—and the possibility of violence—becomes even more likely as political identity starts to map onto other social identities and fewer cross-cutting identities exist to mitigate these impulses.
To explore this relationship between political polarization and political violence on both the individual and societal levels, the author tests two hypotheses: first, whether highly polarized individuals in the U.S. are more likely to support political violence, and, second, whether highly polarized democracies are more likely to experience high levels of political violence.
The author tests these hypotheses through two separate quantitative analyses. First, to examine the relationship between polarized attitudes and individual support for political violence, he draws on a representative survey of 1,899 U.S. residents in 2021. Support for political violence was measured through responses to the question: “Do you believe it is sometimes necessary to use violence to achieve your political goals?” Political polarization or aversion (to the other party) was measured through combined responses to “two questions asking whether the respondent regards members of the opposing party to be a threat to the nation’s well-being and whether members of one’s own party ‘love America more’.”
After controlling for various other relevant factors, the author found support across all his statistical models for the hypothesis that those who are more polarized are also more likely to support the use of violence for political purposes. Republicans and Democrats who “believe members of the opposing political party to be a threat to the nation’s well-being and love America less are more likely to support the use of violence to achieve political goals.” In addition, respondents who were “male, politically engaged, and more aggressive” were also “more likely to support political violence.” The effect of polarization on support for political violence was found to be more pronounced among Republicans than among Democrats.
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Data from first analysis (public opinion survey of 1,899 U.S. residents, 2021: 34.5% Republicans, 44.8% Democrats, and 20.6% independents), examining relationship between individual-level polarization/partisan aversion and support for political violence |
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Support for political violence (“Do you believe it is sometimes necessary to use violence to achieve your political goals?”) Measured on a 5-point scale. |
Strongly or somewhat disagree: 70.5% |
Ambivalent: 19.7% |
Somewhat agree: 6.8% |
Strongly agree: 3.02% |
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Political polarization Measured on a 9-point scale, 2-10, with 2 = no aversion towards partisan opponent and 10 = very high aversion. |
Among Democrats à
Among Republicans à |
High levels of polarization/ aversion towards Republicans (8-10): 38.7% High levels of polarization/ aversion towards Democrats (8-10): 10.2% |
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Probability of an individual expressing support for political violence |
For those with low levels of polarization/aversion (2-4): Among Democrats: 6.7-8.3% Among Republicans: 4.0-6.4% |
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For those with high levels of polarization/aversion (8-10) Among Democrats: 12.4-15% Among Republicans: 14.9-21.7% |
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Next, to examine the relationship between country-level polarization and the occurrence of political violence, the author looks at evidence from 83 consolidated democracies worldwide from 1950 (or 1970, depending on data availability) to 2018. The database used includes measures of the “severity of political violence by nonstate actors” in a particular country/year and measures of political polarization at the country level in a particular year—from no polarization (political opponents “interact with comity and mutual respect within wider society”) to very high polarization (political opponents “interact with animosity and hostility”).
After controlling for other relevant factors, the author found support for the second hypothesis, that “more polarized democracies are more likely to experience greater levels of political violence.” In addition, the analysis revealed that political violence is more likely when there is greater income inequality, a larger population, and/or a history of civil war.
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Data from second analysis (cross-national, time-series data on 83 democracies from V-DEM, 1950/1970-2018), examining relationship between country-level political polarization and occurrence of political violence |
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Political violence (in a country/year) Measured on a 5-point scale. |
Absence (0): 25% |
Rare (1): 44% |
Occasional (2): 18.9% |
Frequent (3): 9.2% |
Often (4): 3.4% |
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Political polarization (in a country/year) Measured on a 5-point scale. |
No or low polarization (0-1): 50% |
Moderate polarization (2): 23.3% |
High or very high polarization (3-4): 26% |
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Probability of a country experiencing political violence frequently or often |
Country with no polarization (0): 1.5% |
Country with low polarization (1): 4.9% |
Country with moderate polarization (2): 12% |
Country with high polarization (3): 24% |
Country with very high polarization (4): 42.9% |
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In conclusion, political polarization makes both support for political violence (on the individual level) and the occurrence of political violence (on the societal level) more likely. Therefore, the author contends that polarization “makes politics more dangerous.” To mitigate this risk and weaken support for violence, the author urges political elites to step up and publicly condemn political violence, tone down “inflammatory [and demonizing] public rhetoric,” encourage tolerance of political opponents, and monitor disinformation.
Informing Practice
As those of us in the United States consider how to prevent election-related violence this November (or before or after), our focus must be trained on toxic polarization in our own communities and how we can be part of efforts to create cross-cutting relationships to help mitigate it. While polarization in this more extreme form can contribute to the dehumanization and moral certainty/superiority that can make violence against (supposedly less-than-human, depraved) “others” seem more acceptable, it can also diminish our capacity to trust and have a sense of common purpose with those on the other end of the political spectrum—qualities that are essential to elections functioning as mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution.
Although much of the responsibility for depolarization and the delegitimization of violence rests with political leaders, there are also critical measures “regular” people can take. First, we can take the four-week Polarization Detox Challenge, a set of daily exercises encouraging us to examine our habits of mind and our social contexts and challenging us to adopt curiosity and bridge differences in our own lives. We can also respectfully push back against comments made by those in our own (often politically homogenous) social circles that demonize or denigrate the political “other,” while of course acknowledging the real and legitimate policy disagreements that exist.
Second, we can join or facilitate a dialogue online or in our own community, run by any number of organizations working on bridging ideological divides, like Braver Angels or Living Room Conversations, again cultivating our curiosity and empathy about others’ experiences and perspectives, even as we may maintain our own strong political opinions and moral stances. Or we can become active with a volunteer or civic association focused on solving a problem or addressing a community need in a way that intentionally brings together people from different backgrounds, like Urban Rural Action.
Third, we can take stock of the associations and organizations we are already involved in (whether schools, faith communities, labor unions, service organizations, sports leagues, or business associations), notice the ideological diversity that may already exist there, and strengthen our relationships with those who differ from us politically, rather than avoiding or marginalizing them. If we find that there is limited diversity, we can be intentional about building connections between the groups we are active with and other groups engaged in similar work but composed of people from backgrounds and perspectives different from our own.
Although these may seem like small-scale actions, the more we build and nurture these cross-cutting connections with people who come from different ideological perspectives—but with whom we may share other identities or commitments or hobbies—the more resilient our communities will be when faced with rising tensions or violent incidents that could otherwise precipitate further violence. We will be less susceptible to caricatures of the political “other” that are meant to mobilize us through fear, anger, or moral indignation. We will be less likely to fall for demonizing language that those inciting violence are likely to use. Instead, we will be able to pick up the phone and reach out to those we know and like on the “other side” to strategize about what we can do together to calm rising temperatures in our own respective spheres of influence. [MW]
Questions Raised
How can we cultivate cross-cutting ties and relationships—especially across ideological divides—in our own daily interactions and communities?
Continued Reading/Watching
Reiff, D. (2024, July 15). How to prevent widespread violence after Trump’s shooting. Newsweek. Retrieved August 22, 2024, from https://www.newsweek.com/how-prevent-widespread-violence-after-trumps-shooting-opinion-1925377
Greater Good Science Center, UC Berkeley. (N.d.). Bridging differences: How to bridge? Greater Good Magazine. Retrieved August 22, 2024, at https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/topic/bridging_differences/definition#how-bridge-differences
Berman, G. (2024, August 12). “It’s time to be very afraid”: A conversation with Peter Coleman. The Polarization Project. Retrieved August 22, 2024, from https://www.hfg.org/conversations/its-time-to-be-very-afraid/
Coleman, P. (2021). The way out: How to overcome toxic polarization. New York: Columbia University Press. https://www.thewayoutofpolarization.com/
Guzmán, M. (2022). I never thought of it that way: How to have fearlessly curious conversations in dangerously divided times. Penguin Random House. https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/691561/i-never-thought-of-it-that-way-by-monica-guzman/
Davis, R., & Davis, P. (2023). Join or die. Delevan Street Films. Retrieved October 14, 2024, from https://www.joinordiefilm.com/
Organizations
The Bridging Divides Initiative: https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/
Starts with Us: https://startswith.us/
The Polarization Detox Challenge at Starts with Us: https://startswith.us/pdc/exercises/
Program on Violence, Politics, and Democracy at the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation: https://www.hfg.org/violence-politics-and-democracy/
Key Words: political polarization, political violence, election-related violence, peacebuilding, bridging divides, dehumanization
Photo credit: CrisMc – stock.adobe.com
