This analysis summarizes and reflects on the following research: Hom, A., & Campbell, L. (2022). The liturgy of triumph: Victory culture, popular rituals, and the US way of wartiming. International Relations, 36(4), 591-615.
Talking Points
- “Liturgies of triumph”—public rituals that symbolically reinforce and celebrate the idea that the U.S. always wins its wars, “embedded in national calendars, public commemorations, and team sports”—shape the understanding and practice of wartime, both producing an expectation for military victory and assuaging public anxieties that emerge from its absence in most contemporary warfare.
- By normalizing and celebrating victorious endings to war, liturgies of triumph “cover over” the devastating violence, messiness, and paradox of actual wartime, “instilling a cultural reflex… to ‘solve’ political… problems” through military means, while preventing necessary, critical discussion about what war can and cannot actually achieve.
- U.S. “wartiming” has become self-reinforcing, as “lofty but malleable” notions of victory drive and shape further warmaking, leading to “mission creep” and “endless war” as clear victory proves elusive, and, at the same time, more frequent and longer stretches of wartime further intensify the imperative to win.
Key Insight for Informing Practice
- Resisting the destructive cycles produced by faith in military victory and recognizing the paucity of military action (and military aid) as a tool for bringing about desired outcomes does not mean abandoning the pursuit of defense or security. Instead of sending weapons to allies, the U.S. can support other security-seeking strategies that may not feel as dramatic or decisive as military action but may actually be more effective at ensuring autonomy, defending against aggression, and creating security.
Summary
So much of international relations theory and practice rides on the assumption that “wartime” is a well-bounded, discrete time period that will end decisively—presumably with a clear victory that will make the world better or solve some problem (totalitarianism, terrorism, etc.) deemed unsolvable through other measures. These assumptions about wartime allow certain practices—like wartime killing—to be legitimated that would not otherwise be.
Strategic, normative, and legal thinking on war all take “wartime” and its “end” as given, building quantitative studies or normative arguments around these concepts, without unpacking them. Andrew Hom and Luke Campbell critically examine these concepts, particularly how wartime is constituted and the implications of its constitution through the idea of victory. They argue that “liturgies of triumph”—public rituals that symbolically reinforce and celebrate the idea that the U.S. always wins wars—shape the understanding and practice of wartime, producing an expectation for military victory and thereby “instilling a cultural reflex… to ‘solve’… problems” through military means, while also assuaging public anxieties that emerge from the absence of victory in contemporary warfare.
| Liturgies: |
“public rituals wherein participants ‘commune’ with the ‘sacred’ through praise, repentance, worship, and other forms of performative symbolism… When ensconced in religious trappings, liturgical ritual helps individuals transcend their individuality and connect with the eternal in an accessible way.” Performed over time and even repeated across generations, liturgies provide familiarity and help frame new experiences in a way that makes sense and provides guidance for problem-solving, thereby acting as “a bulwark against unpredictable outside forces, a symbolic and practical resource which anxious actors can draw on for stability and comfort.” |
| Liturgies of triumph: | “those symbolic routines, prevalent in daily life and popular culture, which publicly or loudly commemorate past victories in ways that speak directly to the nation’s current security politics and future prospects—that is, performative war rituals that commemorate a ‘past’ seen, known, and ostensibly won, which imbues present practices with meaning and pre-figures dispositions towards the future.” |
As the well-established timing standard for war, how does victory inform military and other daily activities? The authors’ answer: through practices resembling “formal religious liturgy.” Because liturgy is “more stylized” than daily experience, it can help people find meaning and comfort amid the uncertainties and difficulties of everyday life. “Liturgies of triumph” link idealized versions of the past and future together in a seamless “culture of victory,” helping manage current anxieties about the elusive nature of victory in contemporary warfare while also portraying war as viable foreign policy.
The authors discuss numerous examples of the symbolic practices that together constitute a “liturgy of triumph” in the U.S., from clothing that broadcasts the U.S.’s perennial victories to books and films that extol the allied victory in WWII; from national monuments, memorials, and holidays commemorating wartime service and victories to speeches, history lessons, and “military reunion videos” linking military sacrifice to its larger purpose; from military bands playing patriotic music to sporting events starting with the National Anthem or sometimes even a military airshow. Although these various symbolic practices may appear mundane and harmless, their power is in the simplicity and “mass consumption” of their message, as they connect Americans to a shared vision of the U.S.’s role in the world, strengthen national identity, and get Americans used to winning, forging a link between the harrowing violence and loss of warfare and the U.S.’s “triumphant eternal struggle.”
The authors argue that it is hard to overstate just how much this “triumphalist imagery” influences the foundations of normative and strategic claims about wartime, as broader thinking and decision-making about war stems from this idea that war can and will lead to decisive victory. Yet, the paradox here is that recent wars have not had these neat, triumphant endings. Instead of encouraging critical thinking about this discrepancy, however, liturgies of triumph provide a comforting withdrawal from reality. As clear victories become ever more elusive, liturgies of triumph become more “seductive” as a form of “collective anxiety management,” increasingly serving as an antidote to the lack of actual victories while also making it harder to recognize how elusive these victories have become.
While the social-psychological purpose they fulfill may be understandable, liturgies of triumph also have real-world political effects: they make Americans think that clear victories are likely when in fact they are not—which directly feeds into decision-making about going to war. By propagating the belief that military action can and will end decisively and favorably, leaders are better able to sell war as a viable policy option and mobilize the populace in support. “[L]ofty but malleable” notions of victory drive and shape further warmaking, leading to “mission creep” and “endless war,” as actual victory remains elusive. At the same time, more frequent and longer stretches of wartime further intensify the imperative to win, “creating a vicious victory cycle.” Self-reinforcing rather than a distinct, well-bounded time period, wartime proceeds without necessary deliberations about what it can and cannot achieve.
Informing Practice
Somehow, we humans are able to make otherwise incomprehensible, widespread violence and destruction of human life, livelihoods, and communities intelligible as “wartime.” Seen through the prism of possible victory, this violence becomes meaningful as a supposedly coherent set of tactics building towards a strategy for bringing about a desired political outcome.
But the raw, meaningless devastation of war continues to rear its head—whether through courageous journalism, anti-war protest, poetry, or the nightmares of veterans or war-affected civilians—however strenuously the “logic” of military strategy is asserted. And when it does, the fierce desire for meaning amid such senseless devastation—especially that of grieving families needing to make sense of a loved one’s death—draws humans back to explanations about the “purpose” violence is presumably serving. And so, in a tragic loop, our faith in the possibility of victory leads us into (and seems to justify) military engagements that—through the destruction and disorientation they cause—lead us right back to those strategic assertions about the reassuring “ends” of war, and so on.
How do we escape?
First, we notice the work “liturgies of triumph” do for making war seem like an effective policy tool and disrupt the stories told about military action being a triumphant answer to difficult problems. We must remind our communities of the horror of war, the wartime stories that push up against dominant narratives to reveal the impossibility of containing violence or controlling its corrosive effects. Despite the reassuring psychological function liturgies of triumph fulfill, we must unmask their political function—particularly how the comforting message of perennial victories can cloud our decision-making.
Next, we engage in critical deliberation about the actual effects of wartime violence. When “we” attack “them,” especially when “our” weapons kill or harm civilians, how are “they” likely to interpret and respond to “our” violence? What will the unintended effects of all the physical, psychological, and communal damage be? As much as we hope such violence will lead them to surrender and succumb to our political vision, what are the factors that may lead them not to? Even if they do surrender, what are the medium- to long-term social-psychological and political effects likely to be? If these discussions reveal the distinct possibility of no clear victory, or even simply of unintended consequences detrimental to our political goals, we must be clear-eyed in asserting that violence—the certain devastation and harm it brings but with always uncertain political outcomes—is not worth the gamble. When assessed rationally, without an emotional attachment to elusive victory or to masculine bravado, military approaches reveal themselves to be poor forms of “problem-solving.”
Third, we ensure that this clear-eyed assessment of war’s actual effects informs U.S. policy. The U.S.’s current support for wars abroad, particularly for Ukraine and Israel, is all premised on this idea that “victory” is possible and will come (Ukraine will finally ward off Russian aggression and maintain its full territorial integrity and sovereignty; Israel will eliminate Hamas and achieve security)—if only we keep pumping in more weapons. But, in fact, sending more and more military aid simply extends the killing, and, as difficult as it is to acknowledge, the combatant and civilian lives lost so far do not bring Ukraine or Israel closer to these idealized outcomes. Recognizing this and criticizing military aid does not mean abandoning the pursuit of defense or security. Instead of sending weapons, the U.S. can support other security-seeking strategies that may not feel as dramatic or decisive as military action but may actually be more effective at ensuring autonomy, defending against aggression, and creating security. These strategies will differ depending on the power relations of the relevant actors and the particular threats they face. For Ukraine, trying to defend itself against the invasion of a much larger country, civilian-based defense provides an alternative pathway, though its viability would have been better assured had it remained the primary strategy from the beginning instead of military defense. For Israel, continuously trying to insulate itself from the anger and resistance of Palestinians who have had their homes, land, and autonomy taken away, the pathway to security lies—perhaps ironically—in ceding its military occupation of Palestine and acknowledging and addressing the very real grievances of its Palestinian neighbors and citizens. In either case, perfect autonomy or security—what we might call “victory” for either Ukraine or Israel—is never assured, but neither is it assured through the interminable killing and destruction called war. The sooner we come to acknowledge that, the better. [MW]
Continued Reading
Wegner, N. (2021). Ritual, rhythms, and the discomforting endurance of militarism: Affective methodologies and ethico-political challenges. Global Studies Quarterly, 1(3). https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/1/3/ksab008/6322325
Sharp, G. (1990). Civilian-based defense: A post-military weapons system. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Retrieved July 29, 2024, from https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource/civilian-based-defense-a-post-military-weapons-system/
Bartkowski, M. (2015). Nonviolent civilian defense to counter Russian hybrid warfare. Retrieved July 29, 2024, from https://www.lluitanoviolenta.cat/sites/noviolencia/files/pdf/gov1501_whitepaper_bartkowski.pdf
Christoyannopoulos, A., Wallace, M., & Dobos, N. (2023, May 3). Is military aid really the best way to help Ukraine? Political Violence at a Glance. Retrieved July 29, 2024, from https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2023/05/03/is-military-aid-really-the-best-way-to-help-ukraine/
Organizations
Win Without War: https://winwithoutwar.org/
Jewish Voice for Peace: https://www.jewishvoiceforpeace.org/
Key words: war, victory, wartime, rituals, commemoration, militarization,
Photo credit: Wiki Voyage
