By Samara Shaz
This essay was selected for publication as part of the War Prevention Initiative’s Feminist Foreign Policy Essay “Un-Contest”.
“We see things not as they are, but as we are.” – Anaïs Nin
Modern feminism challenges the patriarchal view that institutions must maintain hierarchy, aggression, and coercion to function successfully. Feminism in foreign affairs advocates for states to cooperate to prevent violence and delegitimizes the threat and use of violence as a tool of international politics. Therefore, feminist foreign policy (FFP) must be a paradigm shift in the norms and institutions that undergird international decision-making, not simply a set of policy recommendations for state interaction. While norms, like policies, can be warped to serve self-interest, they also have the capacity to create buy-in to effect change both in policy and in the imagination.[1] As such, FFP should include myriad measures to promote norms of cooperation and to dismantle hierarchy in the international system. In great power competition, one such measure could be a transition from brinkmanship towards strategic empathy to promote cooperative communication over attempts to make threats credible.[2]
Great power politics—such as the United States, Russia, and China vying for relative power, security, and influence—often results in brinkmanship.[3] While brinkmanship entails the acceptance of higher risk and greater instability in the pursuit of national interests, strategic empathy asks leaders to think through risk perception from the perspective of their “adversaries” (other leaders).[4] Strategic empathy acknowledges the gap between intention and action, specifically in the perceptions of other actors in politics. By re-reading history with a lens that helps us see the operation of strategic empathy, we can evaluate its utility as an approach to international relations and its viability as a current policy option. In this essay, I will apply FFP in two ways: I will use a feminist reinterpretation of crisis management during the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) to highlight the mechanism of strategic empathy, and I will propose the use of strategic empathy as FFP in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The current story of the CMC in the United States is told after the end of the Cold War, known as “the end of history” because of the transition out of an era of bipolar competition and presumably into one of everlasting peace.[5] The image of finality in America’s defeat over the Soviet Union created a mindset of heroism, where good prevailed over evil, and, as such, Americans were anointed in creating global democracy in their image. There was a need to stick to moral sanctity, to not compromise or sully grand strategy with the influence of outside ideologies, which means the CMC was culturally constructed to be a lesson of American strength.[6] The story proceeds as follows: In response to the American attempt to invade Cuba’s territorial integrity during the Bay of Pigs, Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev agreed to Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s request for a deterrent: nuclear weapons in Cuba.[7]When the U.S. Air Force confirmed the presence of these nuclear missiles, the National Security Council advised American President John Kennedy to preemptively strike and eliminate Soviet warheads before the Cubans could threaten the United States with their use. Instead, Kennedy reached out to Khrushchev, offering to dismantle American Jupiter missiles in Turkey and not invade Cuba in exchange for Soviet dismantling of its nuclear missiles in Cuba.[8]
The retellings of this CMC narrative in American defense circles support rationalism and brinkmanship. Instead of emphasizing a moment where two countries came together to de-escalate, the common post-1991 telling cites great men out-thinking other men. In this story, rationalism, or the concept of reason trumping emotion, created a framework for decision-making that Kennedy and Khrushchev followed.[9] Both knew the other did not want to enter a nuclear war but wanted to test the credibility and commitment of the other side. They were playing chicken based on applied game theory. Through careful and forceful posturing, Kennedy made Khrushchev blink first, made him remove nuclear weapons while Kennedy only had to dismantle outdated systems. While there was a willingness to compromise, compromise was credible because of Kennedy’s power and posture to escalate.
Through FFP, where the narrative centers cooperation instead of competition, a reinterpretation of events shows strategic empathy is what saved the world from a nuclear war, not brinkmanship. Kennedy was not operating under the assumption that Khrushchev or Castro would never launch; he was operating out of fear, which led to a common understanding of what was at stake in nuclear war. Kennedy’s own fear helped him recognize Khrushchev’s fear. A common understanding allows leaders to put themselves in their adversary’s shoes. In other words, it allows for strategic empathy. The CMC is not a moment of toughness and resolve; both sides blinked because both felt out of control under the momentum of nuclear escalation.
Fear of nuclear weapons can create a world of arms racing and coercion to satiate an appetite for deterrence. It can also create dialogue on the common ground of existential threat. Instead of taking the CMC as an American victory, FFP positions this moment of nuclear crisis as an unnecessary risk and strategic failure due to force posturing and highlights the necessity of cooperation and communication. Heroism and nationalism paint a grand portrait of great men who do great things to narrowly avoid the unimaginable. However, the greatness of their avoidance must be undercut with the fact that they created these crisis scenarios in the first place. When defense strategists create systems designed to lend credibility to aggression, it becomes exceedingly difficult to de-escalate. FFP-derived foreign policy narratives erase the heroics of a Kennedy. Trust and communication provide a stable basis for international relations, multilateralism mitigates great power tension, and the appeal of nuclear weapons diminishes.
Sixty years after the CMC, students of international politics must reconcile with history. Did we learn the lessons that fear of a nuclear apocalypse forced Kennedy and Khrushchev to learn? It takes cooperation and communication to stabilize situations where the lives of hundreds of millions are used as a wager. Advances in verification measures and communication technology help, but miscalculation is always a foreign policy risk that can only be decreased with trust. The story of individual success and heroism over compromise influences leaders today, however, making strategic empathy hard to implement.
The meaningful reinterpretation of events like the CMC to highlight the role played by strategic empathy can support current calls to employ strategic empathy now as a mechanism to perpetuate peace rather than escalate towards greater destruction. In Russia’s war on Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened the use of nuclear weapons and employed escalatory language to deter NATO involvement.[10] He has shown resolve in his commitment to accepting only total victory over Ukraine through his September 21, 2022, speech ordering the mobilization of Russian troops and the following sham referendums and legislation to annex Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.[11] In Western media, this war is portrayed as one of aggression, a violation of the right to self-determination promised by the United Nations, and proof that Russia remains a revisionist power unwilling to conform to the liberal world order.[12], [13] Yet the implementation of FFP through the use of strategic empathy would offer alternative actions and narratives surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war. If Putin is reframed as fearful, new avenues for communication and compromise open. This creates a possible way out of the crisis: an opportunity for American leaders to address Putin’s motivations for the invasion while also upholding the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The acknowledgement that leaders operate out of fear instead of rationality is a vital first step in implementing strategic empathy and creating new options for de-escalation. In interpreting the CMC as a tale of brinkmanship, America learned the lesson to assert dominance and U.S. President Joe Biden continues a “peace through strength” strategy that relegates Russia back into the role of an “empire of evil.” Instead of both sides showing resolve, active implementation of FFP would push them to prioritize communication, cooperation, and de-escalation.
Strategic empathy is uncomfortable, but it offers the chance of a new security order as seen in the resolution of the CMC. That is necessary to end wars and prevent even further loss of human life.
Samara Shaz is an International Peace and Security Program Assistant for the Nuclear Security portfolio at the Carnegie Corporation of New York. They can be reached at shazsamara@gmail.com. Views expressed in this essay are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
References
Blight, James G., and Kornbluh, Peter, eds., Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
Colman, Jonathan. “Toward ‘World Support’ and ‘The Ultimate Judgment of History’: The US Legal Case for the Blockade of Cuba during the Missile Crisis, October–November 1962.” Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 12 (2019): 150-173. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00879.
DiCicco, Jonathan M., and Victor M. Sanchez. “Revisionism in International Relations.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (2021). https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.607.
Dickinson, Peter. “Bowing to Putin’s Nuclear Blackmail Will Make Nuclear War More Likely.” Atlantic Council, October 18, 2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/bowing-to-putins-nuclear-blackmail-will-make-nuclear-war-far-more-likely/.
Editorial Board. “Putin Threatens Nuclear War. The West Must Deter Disaster.” The Washington Post, October 3, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/03/putin-nuclear-war-ukraine-deter/.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.
Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (1989): 3-18.
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Goddard, Stacie. “Embedded Revisionism: Networks, Institutions, and Challenges to World Order.” International Organization 72, no. 4 (2018): 763-797.
Head, Naomi. “A Politics of Empathy: Encounters with Empathy in Israel and Palestine.” Review of International Studies 42, no. 1 (2016): 95-113.
Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. WW Norton & Company, 2001.
Parent, Joseph, and Paul MacDonald. Twilight of the Titans. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018.
Powell, Robert. “Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power.” International Organization 69, no. 3 (2015): 589-626.
Putin, Vladimir. “Address by the President of the Russian Federation.” President of Russia, September 21, 2022. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/69390.
Swidler, Ann. “The Concept of Rationality in the Work of Max Weber.” Sociological Inquiry 43, no. 1 (1973): 35-42.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-682X.1973.tb01149.x.
Weber, Max. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. https://www.routledge.com/From-Max-Weber-Essays-in-Sociology/Weber/p/book/9780415482691.
Weldes, Jutta. Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis. University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
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[1] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.
[2] Naomi Head, “A Politics of Empathy: Encounters with Empathy in Israel and Palestine,” Review of International Studies 42, no. 1 (2016): 95-113.
[3] Introductory materials on great power politics include: Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (WW Norton & Company, 2001); Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald, Twilight of the Titans (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); and Stacie Goddard, “Embedded Revisionism: Networks, Institutions, and Challenges to World Order,” International Organization 72, no. 4 (2018): 763-797.
[4] Robert Powell, “Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power,” International Organization 69, no. 3 (2015): 589-626.
[5] Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (1989): 3-18.
[6] Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
[7] The Bay of Pigs was a military invasion of Cuba by the United States in 1961 to overthrow Castro and institute a non-communist government. For more information on the American decision to invade and following actions, I recommend: James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh, eds., Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
[8] Jonathan Colman, “Toward ‘World Support’ and ‘The Ultimate Judgment of History’: The US Legal Case for the Blockade of Cuba during the Missile Crisis, October–November 1962,” Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 12 (2019): 150-173. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00879.
[9] For rationalism, see: Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013).
For critiques of rationalism, see: Ann Swidler, “The Concept of Rationality in the Work of Max Weber,” Sociological Inquiry 43, no. 1 (1973): 35-42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-682X.1973.tb01149.x.
[10] Editorial Board, “Putin Threatens Nuclear War. The West Must Deter Disaster,” The Washington Post, October 3, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/03/putin-nuclear-war-ukraine-deter/.
[11] Vladimir Putin, “Address by the President of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia, September 21, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/69390.
[12] Revisionism is the concept that a state intends not to follow the current norms of the international order, in contrast to “status-quo states,” who do. For more information on revisionism, read: Jonathan M. DiCicco and Victor M. Sanchez, “Revisionism in International Relations,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.607.
[13] Peter Dickinson, “Bowing to Putin’s Nuclear Blackmail Will Make Nuclear War More Likely,” Atlantic Council, October 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/bowing-to-putins-nuclear-blackmail-will-make-nuclear-war-far-more-likely/. This offers one example; others may be found in The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Policy.
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