In the wake of violence, a few common questions tend to dominate public discourse: Why did this happen? What caused this? These are worthwhile questions that we will address below in this review of the drivers of election violence and other forms of political violence, with a particular focus on the U.S. context. But, first, we must acknowledge that any act of violence takes place in a larger social context wherein some amount of violence is normalized and tolerated—and some kinds of violence are even considered politically viable. Drones can drop bombs on “suspected terrorists” without regard for civilians, and the police can brutalize members of minoritized communities without accountability—normalized forms of violence that, though sometimes contested, largely do not spark the same urgent series of questions that other forms of violence do. According to the underlying logic of our national and international political systems, some level of violence is necessary to maintain order. It is also troubling to note that political leaders can skew general understandings about which violence is deemed acceptable in order to inflate their own political power, mobilizing people through violence reinterpreted as necessary or noble.
Given these realities, the task for peace advocates is perhaps paradoxical: We must strengthen the boundary around unacceptable forms of violence (for example, assassination attempts), ensuring that they continue to be seen as abhorrent and intolerable, while also questioning the boundary itself and the way that it leaves many forms of violence on the “acceptable” side, thereby making it possible to challenge these forms of violence, too (for example, police brutality). The resounding condemnation of assassination attempts, for instance, is good—but we must go further to condemn other violence that still hardly registers in mainstream discourse. And we must cultivate curiosity about both, pursuing inquiries into the drivers of any violence.
Our focus here is to begin to respond to those questions posed above, in relation to election violence. Why does election violence happen, and why is the risk for it so high in the United States? Thankfully, election violence is widely condemned. For instance, support for Trump plummeted in the immediate aftermath of the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, according to a survey finding that 68% of Americans “would not like to see Trump continue as a major national political figure in the years to come.”[1] As of the writing of this special issue, there are just a few more weeks before the 2024 U.S. Presidential Elections. The memory of January 6th looms as one of the most significant examples of election violence in U.S. history along with recent assassination attempts on Trump leading up to the 2024 elections—with credible fears remaining that there is a continued effort to undermine the results of a free and fair election. The following information allows us to step back and assess how we got here. This section is split into two parts: the first reviews structural and society-wide factors associated with the likelihood of political and election violence, while the second reviews individual- or group-level factors and motivations for participating in or supporting political and election violence. Where possible, we apply lessons from research to the U.S. context.
Key Terms
- Political Violence: “a heterogeneous repertoire of actions oriented at inflicting physical, psychological, and symbolic damage to individuals and/or property with the intention of influencing various audiences for affecting or resisting political, social, and/or cultural change.”[2]
- Election Violence: “coercive force, directed towards electoral actors and/or objects, that occurs in the context of electoral competition.”[3]
- Violent extremism: The “use or support [of] violence to advance a cause based on exclusionary group identities.”[4]
- Radicalization: “[T]he path that leads an individual to endorse or commit a politically motivated act of violence.”[5]
Structural and Society-Wide Drivers
From an academic perspective, election violence is seen as a “sub-type” of political violence. It is distinguished temporally—meaning, acts of political violence that take place before, after, and during election cycles—and by whom or what is targeted—for instance, public office holders, political parties, opposition groups, or polling places. “Electoral violence is linked to the core aims of political competition: contestation, participation, and the quest for power”[6] but seeks to force a particular political outcome over others. It is important to study apart from other forms of political violence because of the dramatic effect it could exert on electoral outcomes, like lower voter turnout, resulting in weaker democracies or giving way to the rise of autocracies. Solutions to prevent election violence emerge from a specific understanding of what drives it in the first place. Further, electoral violence takes place (almost exclusively) in the context of democracies where competitive elections are the means of determining political power.
Most existing research on election violence is based on evidence from “non-established” democracies outside of the United States and Europe. A non-established democracy, also referred to as an emerging democracy, is considered to have a higher risk of election violence, as democratic norms and institutions are not fully established.[7] This is important to note because the conditions driving election violence in countries with different types of democratic institutions, levels of development, or historical legacies may not fully explain what causes election violence in the United States. With that in mind, we can critically examine what the existing research has to say on what drives election violence and suggest what is most relevant in the U.S. context.
Political, social, and economic grievances are often discussed as a motivating factor of political violence. In the United States, there are grievances identified as salient for the risk of political violence, namely “[h]igher abortion rates, higher levels of female participation in the workforce, [and] a Democratic president”[8] as driving factors behind right-wing domestic terrorism (the most prevalent and deadliest form of domestic terrorism in the U.S.[9]). Considering these grievances within the U.S. context reveals how important it is to incorporate a gender lens in an analysis on the risks of election violence. One paper on gendered political violence found that the preservation of “hegemonic men’s control of the political system”[10]—wherein the role of hegemonic men in public office “is seen as natural, just, and inviolate”[11]—is a motivating factor for violence against women and “non-dominant men and gay, queer, non-binary, and trans individual(s)”[12] in public office.
In the introduction to the Journal of Peace Research’s 2020 special issue on election violence, the causal factors of election violence are organized into three categories:
- Institutional factors, including “level of democracy, strength of institutions, type of election, [and] electoral institutional design,”[13] wherein stronger, consolidated (i.e., established) democracies face a lower risk of election violence.
- Societal factors, including “ethnic polarization, exclusion of ethnic groups from power, parties representing ethnic or religious identities, [and] land patronage,”[14] wherein higher levels of ethnic fracture are associated with a higher risk of election violence.
- International factors, including “election monitoring, democracy aid, [and] violence prevention strategies,”[15] wherein the presence of international monitors reduces the risk of election violence.
Among this list of factors, international factors are the least applicable to the context of the United States where international observers, democracy aid, or violence prevention strategies have not played a significant role in ensuring peaceful elections.
As for institutional factors related to election violence, there are significant concerns about the status of democracy in the United States, which are tied to fears of election violence. These concerns became most prominent following the 2020 election when President Trump orchestrated a wide-scale attempt at subverting the results of a free and fair election, including the events of January 6, 2021. However, a recent Brookings Institution report describes democratic backsliding[16] in the United States as a long-term trend beginning around 2010.[17] This report pinpoints two forms of democratic backsliding in the U.S.: election manipulation in the form of “election procedures that make it harder to vote (like inadequate polling facilities) or that reduce the opposing party’s representation (like gerrymandering)” and executive overreach in the form of “substantial expansions of executive power[,] serious efforts to erode the independence of the civil service, [and] serious questions about the impartiality of the judiciary.”
In addition, several global indices identify democratic backsliding and growing autocracy in the United States. For example:
- Since 2016, The Economist’s Democracy Index categorized the U.S as a flawed democracy.[18] As of 2023, it is ranked at the 29th most democratic country in the world.[19]
- For the last decade, the V-Dem Democracy Index has described the United States as an “autocratizer” (or, a country moving towards autocracy).
- In 2021, Freedom House released a report finding “that the United States’ democracy score dropped by three points due to events in 2020, for a total decline of 11 points on a 100-point scale over the past decade.”[20] While Freedom House still categorizes the U.S. as free, “it has left the higher echelons of that category and now ranks alongside states with less robust democratic histories, such as Romania, Croatia, and Panama.”[21]
As for societal factors, while the existing research is described in terms of ethnic exclusion or ethnic polarization, a similar dynamic can be observed in the United States through increased toxic polarization and long-term, growing inequities among racial groups. These dynamics point to a fraying social fabric, distrust in government, and dehumanization of political opponents—all of which are serious cause for concern. This point is supported by a recent report by Freedom House that identified “unequal treatment for people of color” and “partisan polarization” as contributing to weakening democracy in the United States.[22] Racial inequities—particularly against Black, brown, and Indigenous peoples—are an enduring characteristic of politics and society in the United States; and, while there has been incredible progress over time, there remain significant barriers to full equality.
Political polarization is necessary to democratic political processes. However, when feelings of “strong favoritism towards members of one’s own political party and strong aversion towards members of opposing political parties”[23] (also known as affective polarization) become increasingly widespread, it creates significant problems for democratic processes. The Horizons Project warns that toxic polarization “can often lead to destructive and violent engagement,”[24] as it describes groups that view each other as extreme and contributes to active dislike and dehumanization of the other. In measuring the severity of toxic polarization over time, some political science researchers have found that “warm feelings” towards the opposing political party have decreased steadily since the late 1980s,[25] pointing again to a longer-term trend of toxic political polarization among the major political parties and their supporters in the United States.
The trends demonstrating a weakening democracy in the United States as an institutional risk factor and increasing toxic polarization and racial inequity as a societal risk factor raise serious concerns about the likelihood of election violence during the 2024 U.S. presidential elections.
Individual- or Group-Level Drivers
In addition to research on the society-level drivers of election and other political violence, there is a wealth of research that explores the motivating factors and psychological processes underpinning why individuals or groups commit acts of political violence, particularly in the United States—only the surface of which will be skimmed here. Much of this research happens to be in the field of radicalization and violent extremism. Given that this literature examines the motivating factors behind extremist violence, we should be cautious about how we apply lessons to our understanding of election violence. Nonetheless, there is some overlap between the two forms of violence, and this literature can help to spell out how even regular, everyday people can come to accept the use of political violence as necessary and justifiable.
Perhaps the most insightful finding from this literature is that the human need for group belonging and identity affirmation motivates participation in violent groups, more so than political ideology.[26] Often embracing extreme ideologies is a byproduct of, rather than a motivation for, joining extremist groups. Group identity needs provide the motivation and existing social networks provide the practical mechanisms for joining extremist groups.[27] Understanding that many individuals may be driven to political violence, including extremist violence, by a desire to fulfill basic human needs for identity affirmation and group belonging reveals more effective and less militarized approaches to preventing political violence, including election violence.
The radicalization and violent extremism literature also discusses push, pull, and personal factors that drive individuals to take on extremist beliefs and participate in violent groups.[28] Pull factors largely concern what was discussed above regarding the need for identify affirmation and group belonging, but they also include specific incentives that extremist groups may offer. Push factors refer to structural factors that “drive people towards resorting to violence, [for example,] state repression, relative deprivation, poverty, and injustice.”[29] Personal factors refer to “individual characteristics that make certain individuals more vulnerable”[30] to violence recruitment, particularly mental health status, certain personality traits, and demographic factors like gender and age (young men tend to be more disposed towards violent behavior). Push and personal factors reveal how individual circumstances—like a person’s economic situation or mental wellness—may predispose someone towards participation in violence to achieve political aims. Further, it suggests that strategies to address human needs—like poverty alleviation or investments in public health—could have significant ripple effects on the likelihood of political or election violence.
In sum, human psychological needs for identity affirmation and belonging, or an individual’s economic situation or mental well-being can motivate individuals to support and even participate in violent extremism.
Continued Reading
Gorokhovskaia, Y., Shabaz, A., & Slipowitz, A. (2023). Freedom in the world 2023: Marking 50 years in the struggle for democracy. Freedom House. Retrieved August 14, 2024, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2023/marking-50-years
Williamson, V. (2023, October 17). Understanding democratic decline in the United States. Brookings Institution. Retrieved August 14, 2024, from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-democratic-decline-in-the-united-states/
Repucci, S. (2021). Special report 2021: From crisis to reform: A call to strengthen America’s battered democracy. Freedom House. Retrieved August 14, 2024, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2021/crisis-reform-call-strengthen-americas-battered-democracy
Peace Science Digest. (2021, October 31). Special issue: Countering hate and violent extremism. Retrieved August 19, 2024, from https://warpreventioninitiative.org/peace-science-digest/special-issue-countering-hate-and-violent-extremism/
Beyond Conflict. (2020, June). America’s divided mind: Understanding the psychology that drives us apart. Retrieved August 15, 2024, from https://beyondconflictint.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Beyond-Conflict-America_s-Div-ided-Mind-JUNE-2020-FOR-WEB.pdf
Finkel, E. J., et al. (2020, October 30). Political sectarianism in America. Science, 370(6516). https://lskitka.people.uic.edu/Sectarianism.pdf
Footnotes:
[1] Pew Research Center. (2021, January 15). Views on the rioting at the U.S. Capitol. Retrieved August 16, 2024, from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/01/15/views-on-the-rioting-at-the-u-s-capitol/
[2] Ibid.
[3] Birch, S., & Muchlinski, D. (2017). The dataset of countries at risk of electoral violence. Terrorism and Political Violence, 32(2), 217–236. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1364636
[4] SFCG. (2017). Transforming violent extremism: A peacebuilder’s guide. Retrieved August 23, 2023, from https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ Transforming-Violent-Extremism-V2-August-2017.pdf
[5] Vergani, M., Iqbal, M., Ilbahar, E., & Barton, G. (2020). The three Ps of radicalization: Push, pull and personal. A systematic scoping review of the scientific evidence about radicalization into violent extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43(10).
[6] Birch, S., Daxecker, U., & Höglund, K. (2020). Electoral violence: An introduction. Journal of Peace Research, 57(1), 3-14. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319889657
[7] This explanation is derived from Polity IV, a large dataset that measures levels of autocracy and democracy across all countries since 1946. A non-established democracy is defined by a democracy score that is “equal to or less than 7 in the year before the election on the Polity IV democracy scale ranging from -10 to 10, with 10 being fully democratic.” Kelly, J. (2012). The good, the bad, and the ugly: Rethinking election monitoring. International IDEA, 6. Retrieved on August 13, 2023, from https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-rethinking-election-monitoring.pdf Please view Center for Systemic Peace website for more information on the newest version of the dataset (Polity V): https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
[8] Peace Science Digest. (2017). Motivations for domestic right-wing terrorism in the United States. Retrieved August 16, 2024, from https://warpreventioninitiative.org/peace-science-digest/motivations-domestic-right-wing-terrorism-united-states/
[9] Chermak, S. et al. (2024, January 4). What NIJ research tells us about domestic terrorism. National Institute of Justice Journal. Retrieved August 16, 2024, from https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/what-nij-research-tells-us-about-domestic-terrorism
[10] Bardall, G., Bjarnegård, E., & Piscopo, J. M. (2020). How is political violence gendered? Disentangling motives, forms, and impacts. Political Studies, 68(4), 916-935. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719881812
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Birch, S., Daxecker, U., & Höglund, K. (2020). Electoral violence: An introduction. Journal of Peace Research, 57(1), 3-14. https://doi.org/10.1177/
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Democratic backsliding can be broadly defined as, “the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy.” Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5-19. https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jnlodmcy27&div=4&id=&page=
[17] Williamson, V. (2023, October 17). Understanding democratic decline in the United States. Brookings Institution. Retrieved August 14, 2024, from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-democratic-decline-in-the-united-states/
[18] Castronuovo, C. (2021, February 3). US score falls in Economist’s annual Democracy Index.” The Hill. Retrieved August 14, 2023, from https://thehill.com/homenews/news/537204-us-score-falls-in-economists-2020-democracy-index/. A flawed democracy is defined as, “countries [with] free and fair elections and, even if there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties are respected. However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation.” Economist Intelligence Unit. (2023). Democracy index 2023: Age of conflict (p. 68). Retrieved August 14, 2023, from https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2023/
[19] Economist Intelligence Unit. (2023). Democracy index 2023: Age of conflict. Retrieved August 14, 2023, from https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2023/
[20] Freedom House. (2021, March 22). New report: US democracy has declined significantly in the past decade, reforms urgently needed. Retrieved on August 14, 2024, from https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-us-democracy-has-declined-significantly-past-decade-reforms-urgently-needed
[21] Ibid.
[22] Repucci, S. (2021). From crisis to reform: A call to strengthen America’s battered democracy. Freedom House. Retrieved August 14, 2023, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2021/crisis-reform-call-strengthen-americas-battered-democracy
[23] Piazza, J. A. (2023). Political Polarization and Political Violence. Security Studies, 32(3), 476–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225780
[24] Horizons Project. (n.d.). Good vs. toxic polarization. Retrieved August 15, 2024, from https://horizonsproject.us/good-vs-toxic-polarization-twitt/
[25] Finkel, E. J., et al. (2020, October 30). Political sectarianism in America. Science, 370(6515), 533-536. DOI: 10.1126/science.abe1715
[26] Peace Science Digest. (2021). The role of group identity in initiating, sustaining, and disengaging from participation in violent extremism. Retrieved August 16, 2024, from https://warpreventioninitiative.org/peace-science-digest/the-role-of-group-identity-in-initiating-sustaining-and-disengaging-from-participation-in-violent-extremism/ Drawing from the following research: Ferguson, N., & McAuley, J. W. (2021). Dedicated to the cause: Identity development and violent extremism. European Psychologist, 26(1), 6-14. https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000414
[27] Peace Science Digest. (2021). Special issue: Countering hate and violent extremism (p. 45). Retrieved August 16, 2024, from https://warpreventioninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/WEB-FINAL_SpecialIssue_October2021_Printer.pdf
[28] Vergani, M., Iqbal, M., Ilbahar, E., & Barton, G. (2020). The three Ps of radicalization: Push, pull and personal. A systematic scoping review of the scientific evidence about radicalization into violent extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43(10), 854-854. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1505686
[29] Ibid
[30] Ibid
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