Executive Summary

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – commonly referred to us the Iran Nuclear Deal – is a multilateral agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China plus Germany), along with the European Union. Its primary objective is preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The deal should be examined through the lens of this objective.

Our interpretation of the JCPOA is based on expertise in constructive conflict transformation, nuclear non-proliferation, sanctions, and the many analyses by experts worldwide. It is our clear assessment that the deal reduces the threat of an Iranian nuclear bomb while greatly increasing the global community’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program.

The key takeaways of the JCPOA are:

This agreement blocks Iran from producing the fissile materials required to create a nuclear weapon.
The deal contains the most intrusive and stringent inspections regime ever negotiated.
Walking away from the deal will sabotage the negotiations and shut down the entire diplomatic process.
Walking away from the deal will destroy any chance of re-imposing international sanctions.
A ruined deal will embolden Iran’s radical leaders.
The deal has a broad base of support by the majority of Americans and Iranians, U.S. allies, key scientists, military leaders, faith leaders, and national security experts (including key Israelis).
The deal stands on principles of multilateral, negotiated agreements based on oversight and control, not trust.
The deal is an opportunity to challenge the dysfunctional military-solution paradigm.
The deal makes the U.S. and Israel more secure by reducing the risk of a nuclear armed Iran.
It is in Iran’s self-interest to honor the deal.
The deal is superior to all alternatives, and implementation of the deal will prevent another devastating war in the Middle East.

Click here to download the full analysis (last update 08/26/15)

Introduction

This report examines the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal. The JCPOA is a multilateral agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China plus Germany), along with the European Union.

The War Prevention Initiative has produced this report on the JCPOA to assist in legislative review, inform the media, and contribute to informed public discourse. This report was prepared by experts in constructive conflict transformation, sanctions, and nuclear nonproliferation. This is the lens through which the deal is examined.

The main body of this report is a comprehensive matrix. We examine the multiple arguments made regarding the agreement and provide our own as well as common critiques. We rely on our professional expertise and credible sources for our assessment.

Critics of this deal are already active in trying to derail it. The deal is not the expected “quick fix” that an illusory swift military intervention would have been. That is good, since there is no quick fix for countries at odds for more than three decades (in the case of the U.S. and Iran). This is a constructive path forward that can ultimately restore relationships. It could take years to pay off and nobody expects the process to be without challenges. Here is where the power of negotiation comes into play again. When parties reach agreements in certain areas, they are more likely to overcome obstacles in other areas. History and the theory of negotiation informs us that agreements tend to lead to more agreements.

Another common point of critique is that the outcomes of the negotiated settlements are unclear. That is correct. In negotiation, however, the means are certain and unlike war they do not come with the unacceptable human, social, and economic costs. There is no guarantee that the parties will uphold their commitments, or that the process will go smoothly without the need for further negotiations. This uncertainty is better than the certainties of war, where human casualties and suffering are guaranteed and cannot be undone.

This deal can be a turning point in history where global leaders recognize that collaboration, constructive conflict transformation, and social change outweigh war and violence. U.S. legislators can provide leadership by supporting this deal. They can lead the nation away from the dysfunctional military solution paradigm. Support for this deal means listening to the majority of the American people. Support for this deal means nuclear nonproliferation and preventing another war. Support for this deal means making Americans more secure.

We invite readers with questions, comments, additional points, or constructive critique to contact Patrick Hiller (philler@pdx.edu). Together with the collaborating researchers we will assess those and consider inclusion and attribution into an updated version.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Evaluation Matrix

Arguments for Iran Deal	Support for argument	Common critique of argument[1]
Threat of nuclear armed Iran decreases[2]	This is the bottom line reality of the JCPOA. Review of the document and expert analyses widely support this. In the big picture this deal is a step toward global nuclear non-proliferation.[3]	Public statements by US politicians claiming the opposite are devoid of documentation.
Ability to monitor Tehran’s nuclear program through the most intrusive and stringent inspections regime ever negotiated[4][5]	Inspectors will have 24/7 access to Iran’s nuclear facilities and access to other suspicious sites within 24 days;[6] guaranteed ability to detect nuclear materials for years[7] [8] [9] Iran will not have capacity to develop nuclear weapons grade material without severe consequences. Secret efforts would most likely be detected due to the wide range of constant access and monitoring as well as the work by the intelligence communities.	Efforts to produce nuclear weapons material could be driven into secrecy. Claim of troublesome 24 day wait period before inspection. This claim has been debunked as a mischaracterization of nuclear inspections work.[10]
Existing stockpile of Iran’s enriched uranium will be largely eliminated[11]	The breakout timeline for Iran to develop enough material for a nuclear weapon will be four times longer with a deal than without one.[12]	Not complete dismantlement of Iranian nuclear program.
Iran will not produce any highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear weapons development[13]	The breakout timeline for Iran to develop enough material for a nuclear weapon will be four times longer with a deal than without one.[14]	Not complete dismantlement of Iranian nuclear program.
Number of centrifuges will be greatly reduced[15]	The breakout timeline for Iran to develop enough material for a nuclear weapon will be four times longer with a deal than without one.[16]	Not complete dismantlement of Iranian nuclear program.
The Arak reactor will be retooled so that it no longer produces weapons-grade plutonium[17]	The breakout timeline for Iran to develop enough material for a nuclear weapon will be four times longer with a deal than without one.[18]	Not complete dismantlement of Iranian nuclear program.
Negotiations have already rolled back Iran’s nuclear program	The breakout timeline for Iran to develop enough material for a nuclear weapon will be four times longer with a deal than without one.[19]	–
Sanctions on missile development and arms imports remain in place for several years[20]	While the focus of the JCPOA is on nuclear arms, these provisions add non-nuclear nonproliferation components.	–
Sanctions will snap back into force after an established series of dispute resolution steps when commitments are not met[21]	Strong incentive for Iranian regime to uphold commitments.	Difficulty in setting up an international sanctions regime, once previous sanctions have been lifted and political and economic relationships exist (in particular oil sales).
Polls show that a majority of Americans support a negotiated deal with Iran[22]	Increased recognition by the public that there are alternatives to war based on the existing information on deal. Studies show that when the public knows about alternatives, they are less likely to support war.	Public opinion can change with isolated incidents.
Broad support from former U.S national security leaders, diplomats[23], faith leaders[24], nonproliferation experts[25], and military leaders[26] [27] strongly endorsing deal	In negotiated settlements buy-in from multiple stakeholders with different interests makes the outcomes stronger and more sustainable.	Broad federal elected official opposition to deal with interests that must be assessed.
JCPOA a victory for multilateral diplomacy with American leadership	Diplomacy and negotiated agreements are superior to military intervention and war in achieving the stated outcomes for all parties; negotiated agreements are a powerful tool for achieving nonproliferation objectives;[28] commonly in negotiation, agreements in one area open pathways toward agreements in other areas, especially where interests overlap (e.g. fight against Islamic State). The deal will likely open pathways for cooperation beyond nuclear nonproliferation and sanctions relief.[29]	Diplomacy is only for trusted partners, not for Iran.
Deal promoting improvement of U.S.-Iranian relationship	The relief of sanctions will allow for normalization of political, social and economic interactions[30] (e.g. trade relationships), thereby moderating Iran’s behavior in the region. This approach is a template for resolving international conflicts through diplomacy not war.	Iran is duping the U.S. and will defeat inspections even as it benefits from sanctions relief and pours cash into terrorism.
Majority of Iranian people supporting deal	An important but underestimated factor of the JCPOA framework is the young population. A young, politically active Iranian population (60% of Iran’s 73 million people are under 30 years old) wants to be part of the international community and globalization.[31] Like any other country, Iran is not a static homogenous entity. It is likely that the aging Ayatollahs were pressured to negotiate due to the youth’s demand to open Iran to the world.[32]	Iranians support the deal because they know they will be able to profit and gain a military advantage.
The deal is good for human rights in Iran	Human rights advocates and informed observers believe that the JCPOA will enable Iranians to strengthen civil society and improve human rights within the country.[33] This is a likely scenario common to successful negotiations and conflict dynamics. The JCPOA opens space for Iranians to address human rights issues which were subdued due to the all-encompassing nuclear question and sanctions.	–
The deal leads to long-term export revenue to Iran and job opportunities in the U.S.[34]	A report has shown that between 1992 and 2012 the U.S. sacrificed up to $ 175 billion in potential export revenue to Iran or up to 279,000 lost job opportunities in the U.S..[35]	–

Arguments against Iran Deal	Common support for argument	Critique of argument
We can get a better deal	More sanctions and the threat of military intervention will lead to a better deal.	A false claim, given that the multilateral sanctions regime is starting to fray. If the deal is rejected, international cooperation in sanctioning Iran will disappear. U.S. allies and negotiating partners will be alienated. In the long-term, U.S. influence and credibility in future negotiations will diminish. In essence, this argument is lacking a BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). There are no practical or better alternatives presented if there is no agreement. In negotiation practice this is a losing approach.
		Iran will be more motivated and able to pursue unrestrained nuclear development due to the loss of verification access.
More sanctions	The sanctions have worked and brought Iran to the table/to its knees. We should continue.	There would be guaranteed damage to U.S. relations with European partners. Effective sanctions depend on adaptation by a broad section of the international community.[36]
		Iranian regime would be convinced that regime change and not a negotiated agreement is the goal of the United States.
Military strikes	–	Iran would be not prevented from pursuing a nuclear weapon. Temporary setback (3-5 years) would drive Iran’s nuclear program deeper underground.
		Loss of lives and suffering guaranteed.
		Violent reaction from Iran that could put Israel and other U.S. allies at risk.
		More terrorism and anti-American sentiment in the Middle East and beyond.
		Economic burden on U.S. taxpayers.
		Open-ended low-intensity war with Iran.
Lack of control over Iran’s capability to weaponize its nuclear program	Iran will try to cheat.	The inspections regime is the most intrusive one ever negotiated.[37]
Iran secretly trying to make bomb	Obama “will take the Israelis and march them to the door of the oven.” (Mike Huckabee)[38]	CIA, Mossad and other intelligence agencies have not found that Iran has decided to pursue bomb;[39] if they decided to, they can’t with this deal. Nuclear and engineering scientists state that dispute resolution mechanism built into the agreement greatly mitigates concerns about clandestine activities. “The 24-day cap on any delay to access is unprecedented, and will allow effective challenge inspections for the suspected activities of greatest concern: clandestine enrichment, construction of reprocessing or reconversion facilities and implosion tests using uranium.”[40]
Iran cannot be trusted	Iranian hardliners are against the deal and continue to issue anti-American and anti-Semitic statements. Their influence on a more moderate government needs to be observed.	The deal is about verification, not trust. It is in Iran’s self-interest to have a more normal relationship than being an economically isolated pariah. The verification regime is unprecedented and should not be confused with naïve trust[41]. Nuclear scientists emphasize the innovative approaches to verification, including monitoring of uranium mining, milling, and conversion of hexafluoride.[42] This deal is not a quick fix for countries that have been at odds for more than three decades. This is a constructive path forward, which can ultimately restore relationship. Self-interest is an identified strong driving factor in peace and conflict studies. The JCPOA is a long-term, win-win solution for both sides.[43]
Relief of sanctions will allow Iran to finance aggression and terrorism in the region – Iran continues to be a so-called state sponsor of terrorism	Support for Hezbollah, Hamas and Syria’s al-Assad regime will not end through the deal; human rights violations are not addressed; anti-Semitic statements are not stopped; Iran’s regime will not be a suddenly friendly regime to the U.S.; sanction relief is unlikely to have any connection to the sponsorship of terrorism, since there is no evidence that lack of funds were an impediment.	Deal about nuclear program only – terrorism support sanctions remain in place.[44] [45] According to a secret U.S. intelligence assessment, “Iran’s government will pump most of an expected $ 100 billion … into the country’s flagging economy and won’t significantly boost funding for militant groups it supports in the Middle East”[46]
After 10-15 years verification and enforcement provisions of JCPOA expire	Iran could expand nuclear capabilities to produce nuclear weapons.	If the deal is working successfully there is no reason why an extension of verification measures could not be negotiated. If Iran renews its nuclear program the U.S. and other countries could act in response.[47] The deal includes long-term verification procedures that last until 2040. Others last indefinitely under the NPT and its Additional Protocol.[48]
Iran can cheat by producing fissile material for nuclear weapons in undeclared facilities	–	The JCPOA verification regime is rigorous. U.S. and allied intelligence capabilities offer high probability that covert activity will be detected.[49]
Secret side deal: UN to let Iran inspect their own alleged nuclear site (Parchin site)	Inspections done by Iranians on their own site will lead to cheating. International inspections should be done by international inspectors.	According to Tariq Rauf, former Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination, the AP document is “not an authentic document”.[50] The claim that Iran will be allowed to inspect itself is considered incorrect[51] [52] [53]. The IAEA issued a rebuttal to the account. The Director General stated: “I am disturbed by statements that the IAEA has given responsibility for nuclear inspections to Iran”[54]. The more likely scenario is that Iranians would conduct sampling with close oversight by agency officials.

Conclusion

This matrix has shown that the benefits and opportunities of the arguments in favor of the JCPOA heavily outweigh the costs and risks. Like most complex agreements, this deal is not perfect. However, the deal does meet the most critical goals: preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and creating a mechanism for immediate, strong steps should Iran fail to honor the commitments. This agreement is not a deal by the U.S. administration alone, but by a coalition of five world partners guided by the goal of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.

It should be emphasized that this deal has the very specific objective to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is advisable to look beyond and consider the larger political implications ranging from Iran’s behavior and role in the Middle East, regional power dynamics and ongoing violent conflicts, or global nonproliferation.

It is not in Iran’s self-interest to break key elements of the deal since the costs would be high. If Iran is found violating their agreement, the international community would support the immediate and severe ‘snap-back’ of sanctions and possibly also military intervention.

The JCPOA is a solution-oriented framework rather than victory-oriented. It is a framework where interests of all involved parties are integrated in a constructive way. The deal is a win-win solution, a victory for diplomacy over war and an important step toward global nonproliferation. It is the opposite of naive; indeed, the faith of its critics in war would be touching were it not so inflammatory, dangerous and ahistorical.

Selected key supporters and opponents

SUPPORTING JCPOA	OPPOSING JCPOA
Over 100 former American Ambassadors[55]	The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)[56]
Two dozen prominent Jewish community figures[57]	Anti-Defamation League[58]
340 Rabbis[59]	The Israel Project[60]
More than 70 nuclear nonproliferation experts[61]	Zionist Organization of America[62]
Dozens of retired generals and admirals[63]	Republican Jewish Coalition[64]
Israeli Security Experts[65]	Emergency Committee for Israel[66]
National Security leaders[67]	All candidates for the GOP nomination[68]
Most of the American Public[69]	Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu [70]
Most Jewish Americans[71]	United Against Nuclear Iran[72]
Five former U.S. Ambassadors to Israel[73]	180 retired U.S. generals and admirals[74]
More than 60 U.S. National Security Leaders[75]	Congressional GOP
Most of the American public[76]
Most Jewish Americans[77]

Selected key resources

AIPAC is wrong to reject Iran agreement (J Street)

The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; John F. Kennedy School of Government; Harvard University)

Iran: Resources for Supporting Diplomacy (J Street)

Living with the Consequences. The Effects of Voting Down the Iran Nuclear Agreement. (National Security Network)

[1] The points made here do not necessarily reflect our analysis, but the often stated arguments against the JCPOA.

[2] JCPOA: Preface (iii); Nuclear (A.1-7, B.8,10-12, C.14-16); Sanctions (28); Annex I (B. 2-13, C. 14-15, D16-17, E. 18-26, F. 27-31, G. 32-43, H. 44-48, 50, 51, I. 51, J. 56-59, K. 61-63, M. 66, N. 67, O. 68, 69, P. 70-73, Q. 76, 78, R. 79, 80. S. 81, T. 82); Annex III (B. 4-6, D. 10); Annex IV (2.2.1-6, 2.1.3-10, 6.6); Annex V (B. 8, 12, C. 15, D. 22

[3] JCPOA: Preamble and General Provisions (ii, iii, iv, vii)

[4] JCPOA: Preface (X), Nuclear (A.2,4,6,7, C.15); Annex I (B.3,6,9,10,12, C.15, F.29,30, G.33,34,39-43, H.44,46-51, I.52, J.57-60, K.61-63, L.64,65, M.66, N. 67, O.68,69, P.70-73, Q.75,77,78-80. S.81, T.82); Annex III (B.5); Annex IV (2.0,2.1.1-8,6.6); Annex V (B.8,10, C.14,15, D.19, E. 23)

[5] 29 U.S. Scientists Praise Iran Nuclear Deal in Letter to Obama (New York Times)

[6] Iran deal opponents now have their “death panels” lie, and it’s a whopper (Vox World)

[7] Nuclear Experts: “Impossible” for Iran to Hide Violations within 24 Days (J Street)

[8] JCPOA: Annex I (J.59, N.67.1-4, O.68, 69, P.70-73, Q.76, R.79-80, S.81)

[9] Why it’s impossible to hide nuclear work in 24 days – or 24 years (Reuters; Blog)

[10] Iran deal opponents now have their “death panels” lie, and it’s a whopper (Vox World)

[11] JCPOA: Nuclear (A.1,5,7, B.8,10, C.15); Annex I (B.2, J.56-60, O.68,69, T.82)

[12] JCPOA: Nuclear (A.7, B.8)

[13]JCPOA: Preface (iii); Nuclear (B.8, C.16); Annex I (B.2, E.25, F.27,28, T. 82)

[14] JCPOA: Nuclear (A.7, B.8)

[15] JCPOA: Nuclear (A.2,4,6); Annex I (F.27,29, G.32-43, H.44-51,K.61-63, R.80)

[16] JCPOA: Nuclear (A.7, B.8)

[17] JCPOA: Nuclear (B.8); Annex I (B.2-13

[18] JCPOA: Nuclear (A.7, B.8)

[19] JCPOA: Nuclear (A.7, B.8)

[20] JCPOA: Annex II (A.1.4, B.4.9.1,Footnote 11); Annex V (D.20.1)

[21] JCPOA: Sanctions (24); Dispute Resolution Mechanism (36,37); Annex IV (7.5); Annex V (C.18.1). UNSCR 2231: Operative ¶ 11, 12.

[22] The Iran Deal Poll (The Jewish Journal); 56 percent of people support Obama’s Iran deal. But they don’t think it will work (Washington Post); Americans Strongly In Favor of Iran Deal (Public Policy Polling); Majority of American Jews Support Iran Nuclear Deal (J Street); Millennials strongly back Iran deal (philly.com); Polling: American Jews Strongly Support the Iran Deal & Obama (J Street)

[23] Letter to the President from over 100 former American Ambassadors on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s Nuclear Program (The Iran Project); Statement by National Security Leaders on the Announcement of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (The Iran Project)

[24] 340 Rabbis Urge Congress to Support Nuclear Deal with Iran

[25] More Than 70 Nuclear Nonproliferation Experts Announce Support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

[26] Dozens of retired generals, admirals back Iran nuclear deal (Washington Post)

[27] Israeli Security Experts Urge Acceptance of Iran Deal (J Street); Efraim Halevy on the Iran Deal

[28] Senate testimony by Dr. Jim Walsh of the Iran Project. He refers to: Matthew Fuhrmann and Yonatan

Lupu, “Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Domestic Politics and the Constraining Power of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” January 7, 2015 [Working Paper.]; Jim Walsh, “Learning From Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Nonproliferation,” Paper no. 41, Oslo: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006. Contrary to popular understanding, the rate of proliferation peaked in the 1960s and has declined in every ensuing decade.

[29] JCPOA: Sanctions (33); Annex III (A.1-3, C.7, D.8-10,E.11,F.12-15,G.16)

[30] JCPOA: Preamble and General Provisions (v,xiv); Sanctions (18-22,29,32,33)

[31] The Youth | The Iran Primer. The Youth | The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace (n.d.). Retrieved August 4, 2015. Note: the Iranian population at the time of this publication is 78 million.

[32] The Iranian People’s Reaction to the Nuclear Deal. (n.d.). Retrieved August 4, 2015

[33] Policy Memo: Iranian Human Rights Defenders: Nuclear Deal is Good for Human Rights in Iran (National Iranian American Council)

[34] JCPOA: Nuclear (A.7, B.10,11); Sanctions (19.v,viii, 21.iv,viii-xvi,22) Annex I (C.14, J.57)

[35] Losing Billions. The Cost of Iran Sanctions to the U.S. Economy (National Iranian American Council, 2014)

[36] Kriesberg, L., & Dayton, B. W. (2011). Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution. p. 102.

[37] JCPOA: Preface (X), Nuclear (A.2,4,6,7, C.15); Annex I (B.3,6,9,10,12, C.15, F.29,30, G.33,34,39-43, H.44,46-51, I.52, J.57-60, K.61-63, L.64,65, M.66, N. 67, O.68,69, P.70-73, Q.75,77,78-80. S.81, T.82); Annex III (B.5); Annex IV (2.0,2.1.1-8,6.6); Annex V (B.8,10, C.14,15, D.19, E. 23)

[38] Huckabee: Iran nuclear deal will march Israelis ‘to the door of the oven’. (Washington Post)

[39] See a 2012 compilation of the U.S., Israeli and IAEA conclusions: U.S. & Israeli Officials: Iran is NOT Building Nuclear Weapons

[40] Scientists’ Letter to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal

[41] JCPOA: Preface (X), Nuclear (A.2,4,6,7, C.15); Annex I (B.3,6,9,10,12, C.15, F.29,30, G.33,34,39-43, H.44,46-51, I.52, J.57-60, K.61-63, L.64,65, M.66, N. 67, O.68,69, P.70-73, Q.75,77,78-80. S.81, T.82); Annex III (B.5); Annex IV (2.0,2.1.1-8,6.6); Annex V (B.8,10, C.14,15, D.19, E. 23)

[42] Scientists’ Letter to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal

[43] The Lausanne Framework and a Final Nuclear Deal with Iran. (Arms Control Association)

[44] JCPOA: Preamble and General Provisions (xi)

[45] White House Statement: Sanctions: Sanctions, 3rd Paragraph

[46] Iran unlikely to spend most of its post-sanctions funds on militants, CIA says (Los Angeles Times); we cannot verify this information, but it follows the interpretation of many experts and the election of Iranian President Rouhani on a promise to improve Iran’s economy; some portion of the money certainly might be used for so-called “bad behavior” by the Iranian government.

[47] JCPOA: Nuclear (C.15); Dispute Resolution Mechanism (36,37); Annex I (Q.75,76,78)

[48] Scientists’ Letter to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal

[49] JCPOA: Nuclear (A.2,4-6, B.10-12, C.14

[50] Comments by Tariq Rauf on AP published draft of side agreement.

[51] The AP’s controversial and badly flawed Iran inspections story, explained (Vox)

[52] The P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, August 20 (Arms Control Association)

[53] No, Iran is not allowed to inspect itself. (The Hill)

[54] Statement by IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano

[55] Letter to the President from over 100 former American Ambassadors on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s Nuclear Program (The Iran Project)

[56] AIPAC Statement on Proposed Iran Nuclear Agreement (AIPAC Press Release)

[57] New York Times ad by prominent Jewish community figures

[58] Press Release: ADL Deeply Disappointed After Early Assessment of Final Deal with Iran